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Abstract. The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship between state governments’ 
revenue in Malaysia and their development expenditures. We seek to analyze to what extent the state 
governments are benefiting from the investments that they have made in the form of development projects. 
Given the weak temporal dimension of our sample, we will apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results of our estimations show that when a one-period lag is 
retained, the state governments’ revenue is significantly and positively associated with development 
expenditure. An increase in development projects will lead to an increase in state governments’ revenues. 
However, the results of the other two estimations show that development expenditures are not correlated with 
state governments’ revenue. Together these results may imply that the effect of development projects on state 
governments’ revenues only lasts for one year and will disappear afterwards. This in turn may be explained 
by the fact that most if not all development projects implemented by the state governments are rather small in 
scope and with immediate or short term effect. Nevertheless, the results are not sufficient for us to claim that 
the revenues obtained from these channels will necessarily be used for the repayment of the debt contracted 
to finance the projects. A further investigation is needed in order to see to what extent the proceeds from the 
development projects carried out by the state governments in Malaysia is used to repay their loans.  
Keywords: state governments, GMM, decentralization.  
1. Introduction  
In Malaysia, the state governments borrowing capacity is severely constrained by the enactment in 1976 
of Article 111 (2) of the Malaysian Constitution. According to the Article, state governments can only 
borrow money once they have been authorized to do so by the Federal government. The main objective of 
the limitation is to enable the Federal government to have a hold on the risk of fiscal profligacy that may 
arise due to uninhibited spending by the state governments. As a consequence of this restriction, the 
Malaysian state governments generally use their borrowings for the purpose of financing their development 
expenditure as it will be very difficult for them to obtain authorization from the Federal governments if they 
were to borrow to cover their current expenditures. On another note, given the fact that the state 
governments’ financial resources are rather limited, the latter have no choice but to rely on borrowings to 
finance their development expenditures. Furthermore, it is natural that their borrowings are channelled 
towards the financing of development projects as the latter are more likely to generate future incomes that 
can then be used to service and reimburse the contracted loans. That said, however, it is important to 
emphasize that not all development projects will translate into future resources as some of them may only be 
aimed at providing basic infrastructure to the population (such as the construction of low-cost houses or road 
paving). Nevertheless one may also argue that in the end, even this type of projects will generate income in 
the future as they may increase efficiency as well as labour productivity. A relevant policy question will thus 
be: to what extent are the state governments’ revenues responsive to the amount of development 
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expenditures that they have carried out. If the state governments’ revenues are found to be positively linked 
to the amount of their development expenditures, this may imply that the latter do contribute to the amount 
of revenues collected by the state governments. This in turn may implicitly suggest that the state 
governments will face less difficulty in servicing and paying back the debts contracted to finance the 
development expenditures. On the other hand, for these development projects to turn into future taxes for the 
state governments, it is important that the latter have a share in the future income generated by these projects. 
In Malaysia where most of the tax bases are devolved to the central government, it is plausible to conceive a 
situation where all the proceeds of a development project carried out by the state governments fell to the 
hand of the federal government. In other words, even though the borrowings of the state governments in 
Malaysia are mainly used for development purposes, it is yet to be analyzed whether the revenues of the state 
governments can be expected to increase with development expenditure. If revenues do not respond to these 
investments then funding through borrowing is less reasonable even for development purposes.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the literature. Section 3 
discusses the data and the methodology used in the study. The results of the estimations will be presented in 
Section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review  
The literature on the fiscal behaviour of subnational governments is relatively well developed especially 
on the issues concerning their expenditure behaviour. Shadbegian (1999) estimated the impact local tax and 
expenditure limitations (TELs) have on the level and structure of local government revenue. Using a panel 
data set on 2,955 counties (1962-87), this study demonstrated that TELs decrease the level of property and 
'other' taxes, but increase the level of miscellaneous revenue, partially offsetting the decrease in taxes. 
Rooney (2002) focused on the question of whether home rule authority as granted under the Illinois 
Constitution results in changes in municipal tax structure and tax effort. Analysis of the data collected for 
this paper showed that home rule authority is not a significant factor in the level of taxation imposed by a 
municipality. Stine (1985) tested the asymmetric response hypothesis for sixty-six Pennsylvania county 
governments over the 1978-88 period. This marked a period of retrenchment in which counties experienced 
frequent annual reductions in federal aid. The local government revenue response to federal aid was found to 
be asymmetric. The reduction in federal aid induced a reduction in own-source revenue. The results 
supported the notion that taxpayers prefer fiscal restraint when permanent loss of aid occurs. Jha et al. (2000) 
in their studies on the tax efficiency of 15 major states in India argued that in the country, historically tax 
efficiency has played a relatively minor role in resource transfers from the central to state governments and 
much of this transfer is made on the basis of need and backwardness characteristics of the recipient states. 
However, their empirical results show that that intergovernmental grants to be negatively correlated with tax 
efficiency. They also found that this effect works both directly through the variable “central grants as a 
proportion of total state expenditure” and indirectly through the interaction of this variable with other 
variables. Chaparro et al (2004) examine fiscal data for a large number of Colombian municipalities for the 
1985-99 period with an objective to describe the effects of the transfer system on horizontal balance among 
municipalities. The authors conclude that there is some evidence that transfer growth has discouraged tax 
effort by the municipalities, even in the case of formula-driven Participaciones Municipales (PM) which 
should not in itself create a soft budget constraint problem. More recently Aragon and Gayoso (2005) 
examine the impact of federal transfers on the state governments’ own revenue in Peru. Their results point to 
the existence of a negative relationship between transfers and local fiscal effort in Peru. They also found that 
the effect of transfers on local effort decreases with the level of per capita expenditure of the local 
government. In the case of Malaysia, the literature on state governments’ fiscal behaviour is rather limited 
which is understandable given the relatively small degree of responsibilities that are devolved to the state 
governments despite the federal construct of the country’s Constitution. It is also interesting to note that 
almost all of these works are descriptive in nature and contained relatively little empirical examinations.  
 
3. Data presentation and methodology 
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The study is based on the expenditures and revenues data of the 13 states in Malaysia from 1980 to 2003 
that are obtained from the Yearly Financial Statements of the state government. The data concerning the state 
demographic and economic characteristics are mainly obtained from the State and District Report published 
by the Statistics Department. Expenditures and revenue data are measured in real per capita terms using the 
consumer price index as deflator. In order to examine the responsiveness of state governments’ revenues to 
developments investments, we estimate the following equation: 
     itititit DXR εββα +++= 0ln  
Where R, is the log of the real per capita revenue of the state governments, D is the lagged development 
expenditure of the state governments. We take a lagged value of development expenditure as we believe that 
it takes a certain time before an investment could yield benefit to the state governments. X is the control 
vector that includes the log of the total population, the GDP, the dummy for state governments with 
petroleum resources, the proportion of forest area, the size of the state and the urbanization rate. We also 
included in our model the lagged value of the dependant variable in order to control for revenue persistence. 
Because of the inclusion of the lagged value of the dependant variable, the ordinary panel data estimation 
will yield biased results. The potential bias is function of 1/T and the intra-individual estimator is convergent 
only in the case where T is big. Given the weak temporal dimension of our sample, the bias is potentially big. 
Consequently, we will apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) as developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991).  
4. Results and discussion 
The results of our estimations are reported in table 1. The three columns of the table differ in the lagged 
of the development expenditure retained – one year for column A, two years for B and three years for C. Our 
estimations showed that the joint hypothesis of correct model specification and valid instruments cannot be 
rejected and while the disturbances exhibit negative first-order serial correlation, there are no sign of second-
order serial correlation. 
The results of our estimations show that when a one-period lag is retained, the state governments’ 
revenue is significantly and positively associated with development expenditure (column A). An increase in 
development projects will lead to an increase in state governments’ revenues. This implies that the 
Malaysian state governments do benefit from the development expenditure that they have carried out. They 
should thus be able to service and eventually repay the debt that they have contracted in order to finance 
these expenditures. However, the results of the other two estimations (column B and C) show that 
development expenditures are not correlated with state governments’ revenue. Together these results may 
imply that the effect of development projects on state governments’ revenues only lasts for one year and will 
disappear afterwards. This in turn may be explained by the fact that most if not all development projects 
implemented by the state governments are rather small in scope and with immediate or short term effect1. 
Indeed given the lower scope of responsibilities of the state governments, most development activities are 
under the purview of the federal government. As a result, these projects will only yield revenues to the state 
governments once and no other financial benefits can be obtained from them afterwards. As for the control 
variables, only lagged revenue and population are found to be significantly correlated with state 
governments’ revenue.  
One may argue that the effects of the development expenditure to the state governments’ revenue 
actually take place through the transfers that the state governments receive from the federal government. 
Since most of the taxes are devolved to the federal government, it is very likely that the latter will be the one 
who will benefit directly or indirectly from development projects implemented by the state governments. In 
other words, the developments may have potential future incomes attached to them but these incomes will 
mainly be enjoyed by the Federal government due the way taxation powers are distributed in Malaysia. 
Nonetheless, state governments may still be able to get some benefits from these projects through the 
transfers that they receive from the Federal government. If this is the case, then it would mean that it is 
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ultimately the federal government that will decide whether the state governments will benefit from their 
developments expenditures or not. And this will also mean that the Federal government has in its hand a 
powerful source of influence that it can exert on the state governments. In order to test for this argument, we 
re-estimate the equation above by replacing our dependant variable with the state governments’ own revenue. 
If the effect of the development transit mainly through the federal grants, we shouldn’t find any correlation 
between our dependent variable and the development expenditure. Table 2 summarizes the results of our 
estimations.  Our results seem to indicate that even after controlling for the federal transfers, development 
expenditures are still found to be positively correlated with state governments’ revenues. Again, only one-
year-lagged development expenditures are found to be significantly and positively correlated with state 
governments’ own revenue. It is also noteworthy that the estimated parameters for all the variables are of 
similar magnitude to the one found previously. The results may signify that the benefits from the 
development projects implemented by the state governments do not transit through the federal transfers. As 
for the control variable, only lagged revenues and population are found to be significant. The estimations 
also found that the joint hypothesis of correct model specification and valid instruments cannot be rejected 
 
Table 1. The effects of development expenditure on revenue 
 A B C 
Lag revenue 0.6388 (0.1532) *** 0.7398 ( 0.1067) *** 0.6835 (0.1163) ***   
Lag dev. Exp 0.0989 (0.0461) * 0.0336 (0.0255) 0.0581 (0.0392) 
Size 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) 
Petrol 0.2345 (0.1629) 0.1859 (0.1204) 0.2243 (0.1290) 
Population -0.1082 (0.0409) ** -0.0902 (0.0424) * -0.0935 (0.0427) ** 
Forest -0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) 
Urban 0.0028 (0.0027) 0.0022 (0.0014) 0.0027 (0.0014) * 
GDP 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0003(0.0002) 0.0004 (0.0003) 
Constant 1.8284** (0.7912) 1.5331** (0.6498) 1.6715 (0.6622) ** 
Hansen test  8.02 2.96 3.70 
Hansen p-value 0.432 0.564 0.448 
















Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% level***. 
 
Table 2. The effects of development expenditure on own revenue 
 A B C 
Lag revenue 0.6375 (0.1537) *** 0.7351 (0.1032) *** 0.6833  (0.1164) *** 
Lag dev. Exp 0.0992 (0.0462) * 0.0347 (0.0269) 0.0581 (0.0392) 
Size 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) 
Petrol 0.2358 (0.1635) 0.1913 (0.1178) 0.2246 (0.1292) 
Population -0.1085 (0.0410) ** -0.0911 (0.0412) * -0.0936 (0.0427) ** 
Forest 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000) 
Urban 0.0028 (0.0020) 0.0023 (0.0015 ) 0.0028 (0.0014) * 
GDP 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.00023) 0.0004 (0.0003) 
Constant 1.8337 (0.7925) ** 1.552 (0.6291) 1.6722 (0.6626) ** 
Hansen test  8.01 5.08 3.70 
Hansen p-value 0.432 0.279 0.449 
1st order 
AC (prob) 
-2.93   
(0.003) 






0.71   
(0.475) 




Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% level***. 
5. Conclusion  
The main objective of this study is to analyze to what extent the state governments are benefiting from 
the investments that they have made in the form of development projects. Based on our results, it appears 
that state governments in Malaysia managed to derive some benefit from the developments projects that they 
have implemented. We also found that the benefits of the development projects do not transit through the 
transfers from the federal government. However, the benefits of the projects seem to be of a very short 
period as only projects carried out a year before has an effect on the state governments’ revenue.  
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Nevertheless, the results are not sufficient for us to claim that the revenues obtained from these channel will 
necessarily be used for the repayment of the debt contracted to finance the projects. A further investigation is 
needed in order to see to what extent the proceeds from the development projects carried out by the state 
governments in Malaysia is used to repay their loans.   
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